The Wargamer

Introduction

Certainly it was bound to come out sooner or later, and finally Osprey Publishing has made it official. Napoleon’s secret weapon, the primary instrument that amplified personal genius into victory, has now been revealed to the world. One might immediately think on the employment of huge cavalry reserves, with regiment after regiment of cuirassiers, clanking along in their polished, silver armor. Or perhaps it was the use of massed artillery fire, such as the 100+ gun behemoth deployed by French General Law de Lauriston (1768 – 1828) at Wagram in 1809. One Adjutant and Major von der Marwitz would likely point to seemingly eternal swarms of French skirmishers, that irregular sort of Revolutionary soldier, who shot silly his parade ground pretty ranks of Prussian infantry in 1806. And let us not forget about the implementation of the permanent Corps d’ Armée tactical structure. Was it one of these?

Nope.

Instead Ronald Pawly, ably assisted by Patrice Courcelle’s classy illustrations, have given us two immeasurably superior volumes on what was essentially the brains of Napoleon’s Grande Armée. This was the Emperor’s vaunted Imperial General Headquarters (Grand Quartier Général Impérial, or simply IHQ for this review), and this organization, in the hands of history’s greatest of all captains, would have such a profound impact on warfare that its influence reverberates even today. Suffice it to say that the United States military still uses a staff system based on the organizational and procedural principals of Napoleon’s IHQ. Yes, it was that damn good and in two short Osprey tomes Pawly and Courcelle afford an inside glimpse as to why. For any student of warfare, this is one literary train you can ill afford to miss.

Volume 1 of this two book set, looks at the formal organization of Napoleon’s Imperial Headquarters, as well as many of the often colorful personalities that passed through it. Volume 2 looks at the organization on campaign, specifically the 1815 adventure that ended on the fields of Waterloo.

Historical Background

When teaching at the US Army War College, Dr Richard Gabriel commented that in 1806, all of Europe wondered whether the Prussian army was still the army of Frederick the Great. Gabriel noted that it was indeed, and this was its entire problem. From a command and control perspective, this essentially meant that tactical, or field headquarters, did not exist until war actually began. Each commander would then develop his headquarters and its functions as he saw fit, drawing its personnel from those units under his command. There was no common or permanent organizational structure, and no standardized doctrine, no set way of doing business. Given that the armies of the 18th century were essentially groups of automatons functioning on autopilot when battle began, the staff only attended to the administrative tasks leaving the king-commander to handle all operational functions, such a system (or the lack thereof) got by pretty well. Since all armies were managed in this way, this organization, or more accurately disorganization, was neither an advantage nor a disadvantage to any country military. It was ad hoc as hell, but it worked.

The French Revolution forever changed this organizational nonsense. Instead of a small, easily manageable professional army, France saw herself having to deal with hundreds of thousands of soldiers due to the levée en masse. Thus a permanent staff organizational system supported by a permanent related doctrine was born out of pure necessity, and from Paul Thiebault’s ingenious staff manual (which had its origins by a dressing down given its author by a certain General Bonaparte) From these humble origins, Napoleon’s IHQ sprang forth.

This organization not only freed the Emperor from dealing with mundane tasks, allowing him to concentrate on the military issues at hand, but it provided a vast reservoir of information and expertise to assist him in his decision making process. In addition, the IHQ enabled Napoleon to continue civilian rule of his empire, while on campaign. The IHQ further allowed for control of multiple formations over vast distances rather than a single army on a common route of march. This capability was essential for implementing the Corps d’ Armée structure. Which in turn produced an army that gained its speed by living off the land and it provided Napoleon untold flexibility - the avoidance of being locked into a plan coupled with the ability to adjust on the fly. It was all geared to make Bonaparte the ultimate intuitive general and worked so well that the very lack of detailed planning became a hallmark of Napoleon’s planning process.

Volume 1 begins its discussion of this amazing entity by introducing the reader to the very start of the 1805 Austerlitz campaign. There were the many challenges in moving an army of some 200,000 from their bivouacs along the English Channel completely across France towards an enemy so far away. Yet in three short pages and a plethora of names the reader starts to understand that supporting Napoleon is a polished, well oiled machine that will make the impossible seem ordinary and serve triumph up on a platter in but three short months.